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Enforcing a Unitary Patent in 
Europe: What the U.S. Federal Courts and 
Community Design Courts Teach Us 
PHILIP P. SOO* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Document Security Systems (“DSS”), a company in Rochester, 
New York, provides advanced anti-counterfeiting technologies to 
corporations, banks, and governments worldwide.1 One of its 
proprietary technologies is a method of making a document cleverly 
induce a moiré pattern (i.e. optical interference pattern) when the 
document is photocopied, thus making it immediately apparent that the 
copy is a counterfeit.2 European Patent No. 0455750, granted in 1999, 
eventually provided DSS patent rights to this method in thirteen 
European countries.3 Upon discovering that the European Central Bank 
(“ECB”) was using this anti-counterfeiting measure, DSS filed an 
infringement suit in August 2005, claiming that the ECB manufactured 
and distributed euro banknotes using its patented technology.4  
The ECB would not go quietly, challenging the venue of the 
lawsuit and arguing that each individual country where the ECB 
                                                          
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013; Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000; B.S., 
Cornell University, 1994. The author acknowledges Professor Karl Manheim, Professor Joseph 
Straus, Stefan Wilhelm, Dean Harts, and Simon Klopschinski for their feedback and the Loyola 
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review staff for their extraordinary attention 
to detail in the publication process.  
 1. About DSS, DOC. SEC. SYS., http://www.dsssecure.com/about-dss (last visited June 30, 
2012). 
 2. See EP Patent No. 0455750, ¶¶ 7–9 (filed Jan. 16, 1990). 
 3. Id. ¶ 1. 
 4. Case T-295/05, Document Sec. Sys. v. European Cent. Bank, 2007 E.C.R. II-2844, ¶¶ 
15–16, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005B0295:EN:HTML. 
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operates must be sued on a nation-by-nation basis.5 In March 2006, the 
ECB filed counterclaims in the United Kingdom and Luxembourg in 
parallel actions, seeking to invalidate the patent on the basis that it 
lacked novelty.6 Challenges to the validity of the patent, largely in the 
same form, were subsequently served in the Netherlands, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and France.7 The United Kingdom, a 
forum with a recent reputation for being unfriendly to patent 
proprietors,8 declared the DSS patent invalid for a different reason—that 
the patent disclosure was insufficient to support the claims.9 Yet, just a 
day later, the comparatively pro-patent Germany held that the same 
patent was valid.10 
Six years have gone by since the initial DSS lawsuit, and there is 
still no agreement over the validity of European Patent No. 0455750. 
Three jurisdictions—Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain—have 
upheld the validity of the DSS patent.11 Courts of the United Kingdom, 
Austria, Belgium, and France invalidated the patent, while the question 
of invalidity in Italy is still pending.12 Who are the casualties in this 
bewildering state of affairs? The primary losers are ostensibly the 
litigants. Lawsuits are notoriously costly, with average litigation costs in 
just four European countries totaling about €3.6 million ($4.6 million in 
2012).13 The countries also suffer, since duplicative litigation results in a 
substantial waste of judicial resources. Perhaps the greatest casualty of 
all is the European patent system itself, since confusing and 
contradictory rulings irreparably damage its credibility and standing 
amongst present and future patent proprietors.14 
This Note submits that a unitary patent right in Europe is ripe and 
should be timely promulgated to incentivize innovation and investment 
                                                          
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at II-2844. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Gary Moss & Robert Lundie Smith, Forum Shopping: Is the England and Wales 
Patents Court Really a Non-Starter for Patentees?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 715 (2011), 
available at http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/rls0711.pdf. 
 9. Document Sec. Sys., 2007 E.C.R. at II-2845. 
 10. See Moss & Smith, supra note 8, at 4 (acknowledging the preference for Germany and 
the Netherlands as forums for litigation as a patentee). 
 11. Mary Stone, Court Rules Document Security Systems Patent Valid in Spain, ROCHESTER 
BUS. J. (Mar. 24, 2010, 3:36 PM), available at http://www.rbj.net/print_article.asp?aID=183392. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Malwina Mejer & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Beyond the Prohibitive Cost 
of Patent Protection in Europe, VOX (Apr. 10, 2009), http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3440. 
 14. Id. 
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needed in the presently embattled European economy. Part II begins by 
tracing the evolution of European patent rights, from the Paris 
Convention to the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and most recently to the 
European Patent Convention. From there, Part II reviews past efforts to 
integrate these rights and the ultimate failure of these efforts to provide 
multinational patent enforcement in Europe. Part III will then examine 
both legal and practical issues confronting a unitary patent system, 
emphasizing the challenges in harmonizing the European Patent 
Convention with the governing European Union treaty for countries 
bound by both agreements.  
 Part IV follows up this discussion with a comparison between two 
existing approaches to achieving a unified patent court:  one based on 
the U.S. Federal Court system and the other based on European 
Community design courts. While both approaches effectively enforce a 
unitary right, the latter approach should inform the unitary patent 
project.  
Finally, Part V addresses specific criticisms leveled at the current 
Patent Court agreement concerning, in particular, its legality and 
practicability. First, under both the European Patent Convention and 
governing EU treaties, the roles played by non-European Union 
institutions, particularly the European Patent Organization and the 
Patent Court, have an express legal basis. Second, the proposed 
regulation and agreement rightfully empowers the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) to check the Patent Court in matters of patent law. Part 
V concludes by cautioning that the ECJ, if so empowered, should 
emulate the judicial restraint of the U.S. Supreme Court in creating a 
viable legal foundation for a unitary patent system. 
II. EUROPEAN PATENT LAW REMAINS FRAGMENTED DESPITE GROWING 
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AMONGST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
A.  Historically, Territoriality Governed European Patent Rights  
Patents are granted for useful inventions, including improvements, 
which satisfy a minimal level of non-obviousness.15 A purpose of patent 
law is to encourage innovation by providing an inventor a limited 
monopoly whereby others can be excluded from marketing and 
                                                          
 15. See W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS 
AND ALLIED RIGHTS § 1-01 (4th ed. 1999). 
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financially exploiting the invention.16 In exchange, the invention is fully 
disclosed to the public, where the disclosure can spur further inventions, 
ultimately benefitting society.17 
Historically, patent rights followed the principle of territoriality: 
each country created and enforced its own patent rights exclusively 
within its jurisdiction.18 Following the Second World War, however, the 
political and economic structure of Europe became transformed as 
countries realized the potential benefits of integration.19 In 1957, talks 
culminated in six European countries signing the Treaty of Rome, 
which created the European Economic Community (“EEC”).20 The 
Treaty of Rome sought, “by establishing a common market and an 
economic and monetary union . . . to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic 
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth . . . a high degree of 
convergence of economic performance . . . and economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States.”21 In an effort to 
promote further economic, social, judicial, and political cohesion, the 
Treaty on European Union successively amended first the Treaty of 
Rome, and then the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“Lisbon Treaty”).22 As will be discussed, the latter treaty further 
reformed EU institutions and provided a new legal basis for EU-wide 
intellectual property rights. 
                                                          
 16. Daniel Hanrahan, Get Your Dirty Gray Market Goods Out of My Country — 
Enforcement of Patent Rights in the EU, 18 DIGEST 1, 2 (2010).  
 17. Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 401, 402 (2010).  
 18. Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, 
International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 340–41 (1999). 
 19. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAW 396 (1993). 
 20. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf. 
 21. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 40, 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:325:0001:0184:EN:PDF 
 22. See Treaty on European Union, Jul. 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/maastricht_en.pdf; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 
O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter TFEU], available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_lisbon_treaty.pdf. 
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B.  The Current European Patent Does Not Provide a Unitary Right 
The merits of a unified patent system in Europe will not be fully 
appreciated without first examining the prevailing procedures for patent 
grant and enforcement, which are closely intertwined. As will be shown, 
the current European Patent system, despite being crafted in the spirit of 
integration, fragments the European market and suppresses innovation.23    
 The present patent grant system in Europe incorporates particular 
aspects of a European common market in procedure while retaining 
traditional aspects of territoriality in substance.24 At one time, the 
process of obtaining a patent was purely national. A patent applicant 
was forced to apply simultaneously in every country in which protection 
was sought, since a patent filing in one country destroyed novelty for 
subsequent applications anywhere else.25 The high upfront costs were 
prohibitive to most applicants seeking multinational patent protection.26 
The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, or Paris Convention, became effective in 1884 and was a 
primary step in harmonizing patent rights between countries.27 The Paris 
Convention established two fundamental principles: (1) national 
treatment, and (2) right of priority.28 National treatment requires 
member states to give nationals of other member states the same 
advantages under their domestic patent laws as they give to their own 
nationals.29 Right of priority entitles a patent applicant of one member 
country to a period of twelve months after the initial patent application 
to apply for protection in all of the other member countries.30 As a 
                                                          
 23. Joseph Straus, The Present State of the Patent System in the European Union as 
Compared with the Situation in the United States of America and Japan, in MAX PLANCK 
INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL PATENT, COPYRIGHT AND COMPETITION LAW 5 
(1997), available at http://www.suepo.org/public/background/straus.pdf. 
 24. Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. the 
European Union, 40 IDEA 49, 53 (2000). 
 25. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 
IDEA 529, 532 (1997–1998). 
 26. See Bender, supra note 24. 
 27. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html (revised at Brussels on December 14, 
1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 
1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and amended on 
September 28, 1979). 
 28. Id. arts. 2, 4. 
 29. Id. art. 2. 
 30. Id. art. 4.  
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result, a patent applicant in any member state can enjoy an early priority 
date, while gaining a full year to evaluate the economic viability of the 
invention before committing the exorbitant costs of filing in multiple 
countries around the world.31 One hundred seventy-four countries, 
including essentially all of Europe, are contracting parties to the Paris 
Convention.32 
The 1970 Washington Treaty, or Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(“PCT”), took an additional step toward harmonization, by allowing a 
patent applicant to file an “international” patent application that has 
effect in many countries.33 The treaty’s primary objective was to help 
“minimize duplicative patent application and examination worldwide.”34 
In brief, the PCT allows for filing of an international application in any 
of several designated patent offices.35 An international search authority 
(provided by one of several designated national patent offices) generally 
then classifies the invention, performs a search, and provides a search 
report and written opinion concerning the novelty, inventive step, and 
industrial applicability.36 Generally around thirty months after filing, the 
PCT application enters the “national phase,” where rights can be 
continued by filing in national patent offices, along with required 
translations and fees.37 Patent examiners in each country then 
individually assess the patentability of the claimed invention, resulting 
in either patent grant or rejection.38 Thus, while the PCT consolidates 
the initial application process and provides an additional eighteen 
months beyond the Paris Convention date to reflect on the desirability 
of seeking protection in foreign countries, “it does not alter the 
substantive requirements of patentability in the Member States.”39  
                                                          
 31. Bender, supra note 24, at 55. 
 32. See Summary Table of Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention, WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2 (last visited Sep. 5, 
2012). The tiny country of Brunei Darussalam was the latest to join, becoming a party on 
February 17, 2012. Id.  
 33. See Patent Cooperation Treaty arts. 9, 11, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 
231 [hereinafter PCT], available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf. (amended on 
September 28, 1979, modified on February 3, 1984, and on October 3, 2001). 
 34. Bender, supra note 24, at 55. 
 35. Id. at 56. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. PCT, supra note 33, art. 27(5); see also Binder, supra note 24, at 57 (noting that member 
states retain ability to legislate their own standards of patentability and restrict the types of 
patents that can be granted). 
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Following the PCT, Europe forged its own regional patent system. 
Spurred in part by the desire to harmonize traditionally national patent 
laws within the EEC, the 1973 European Patent Convention (“EPC”) 
established a multinational system for granting patents throughout 
Europe.40 The EPC allows an applicant to file a consolidated “European 
Patent” application with the European Patent Office (“EPO”). The 
European Patent is capable of granting parallel patent rights in any 
number of designated countries participating in the Convention.41 
Advantages of this system include: (1) a centralized grant procedure in 
one of three official EPO languages (German, French, and English); (2) 
reduced costs, if the applicant seeks protection in many European 
countries; and (3) a comprehensive prior art search and examination.42 
The EPC provides quality control through a nine-month “opposition 
period” beginning immediately after the grant, during which third 
parties may challenge and revoke claims of the patent.43 Independent 
Boards of Appeal examine decisions of the receiving, examining, legal, 
and opposition divisions of the EPO.44 Significantly, the EPC operates 
outside of the framework of the Treaty of Rome, and hence the EPO is 
not an EU institution.45 
Participation in the EPC patent grant system has always been 
optional.46 Patent applicants in the EU may forgo the EPC and directly 
file patent applications with national patent offices.47 Moreover, patents 
granted by the EPO for a state generally have the same effect and are 
subject to the same conditions as those granted by a national patent 
office.48 Nonetheless, the EPC has been highly successful.49 Patent 
filings climbed from 106,346 to 142,810 with record highs in seven out 
                                                          
 40. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5, 
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter EPC], available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201065/volume-1065-I-16208-English.pdf. 
(as revised by “Act revising Article 63 EPC of December 17, 1991” and “Act revising the EPC of 
November 29, 2000”). 
 41. Id. art. 67(1). 
 42. Kevin R. Casey, The European Patent “Situation,” 9 DEL. L. REV. 107, 108 (2007). 
 43. See EPC, supra note 40, arts. 99, 100. 
 44. See EPO – Boards of Appeal, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.epo.org/about-
us/boards-of-apeal.htmlhttp://www.epo.org/about-us/boards-of-apeal.html. 
 45. Straus, supra note 23, at 1. 
 46. See Seth Cannon, Achieving the Benefits of a Centralized Community Patent System at 
Minimal Cost, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 415, 418 (2003). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 419. 
 49. Id.  
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of ten years.50The number of “European Patents” granted also generally 
increased from 49,365 in 2002 to 64,346 in 2011.51As of this writing, 
thirty-eight member states participate in the EPC.52  
C.  The National Courts Cannot Harmonize Fragmented Patent Rights 
The proponents of a unified European Community faced a major 
hurdle in their efforts toward harmonizing patent enforcement. While 
the EPC provided a logical foundation, its end product was a 
nonstarter—a “bundle” of national patent rights that must be enforced 
individually in the national courts of its respective member states.53  The 
EPC created a unified system for examining and granting patents, yet 
infringement disputes are adjudicated by national courts.54 Each court 
applies its own national rules for claim construction and infringement 
analysis, which creates the potential for inconsistent infringement 
rulings.55 As noted by scholar Graeme Dinwoodie: 
To obtain relief in more than one country for acts of intellectual 
property infringement, a plaintiff was required to sue separately in 
every country in which infringement was alleged to have occurred, 
notwithstanding that the allegations might involve the same conduct 
by the same defendant with respect to what in fact was the same 
piece of intellectual property.56 
In 1989, Dutch courts led the initial charge against territoriality 
with a landmark decision in a trademark case, Lincoln v. Interlas, which 
established the basis for multinational patent enforcement for nearly two 
decades.57 Interlas was a Dutch company that “imported diesel welding 
units bearing the ‘Lincoln’ trademark from the U.S. into the 
Netherlands, modified the units, and offered them for sale throughout 
                                                          
 50. European Patent Applications Filed with the EPO, EUR. PAT. OFF. (June 6, 2011), 
http://www.epo.org/about-us/statistics/patent-applications.html. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Member States of the European Patent Organisation, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/member-states.html [hereinafter EPO Member States]. 
 53. See EPC, supra note 40, art. 2(2); Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 25, at 542.  
 54. See EPC, supra note 40, arts. 63(2). 
 55. See Brian Turner, The German Formstein Case: An Alternative Harmony, 14 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 181 (1992). 
 56. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Boundaries of Intellectual Property Symposium: Crossing 
Boundaries: Developing A Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise Of 
Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 733 (2009). 
 57. HR 24 November, 1989, NJ 1992, 404 m.nt. (Lincoln/Interlas) (Neth.). 
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Europe.”58 The Dutch owner of the trademark sued Interlas for 
trademark infringement in the Netherlands.59  The owner, who also held 
trademark rights in Belgium and Luxembourg, sought injunctive relief 
in all three countries.60 At that time, rules of international jurisdiction 
were set out by the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Brussels 
Convention”) and made applicable to EU member states.61 The Dutch 
court granted the injunction in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg.62 On appeal, the Dutch Supreme Court affirmed the 
injunction on the basis that intellectual property transcends national 
borders and it would be undesirable for an injured party to be forced to 
file suit in every country where infringement occurred.63 
Following Interlas, Dutch courts extended the principle of cross-
border injunctive relief to matters of patent infringement.64 Although the 
Brussels Convention does not directly address patent infringement, 
Dutch courts cited Article 24 of the agreement, which provided that 
“application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such 
provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under 
the laws of that state, even if, under this Convention, the courts of 
another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the 
matter.”65 Patent holders bringing enforcement proceedings in Dutch 
courts also successfully invoked a nuance in the Brussels Convention 
that further extended their jurisdictional reach.66 Article 6(1) allows 
defendants to a multi-party suit who are domiciled in different 
                                                          
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention], available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:41968A0927(01):EN:HTML. 
(the Brussels Convention was later revised in the 1978 Accession Convention to include Article 
Vd, which provided “exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of each Contracting State for any 
European patent granted for that state, regardless of domicile of the defendant and without 
prejudice to the jurisdiction of the EPO under the EPC.” Straus, supra note 23, at 406. 
 62. Lincoln/Interlas, supra note 57. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Kerry J. Begley, Multinational Patent Enforcement: What the “Parochial” United 
States Can Learn from Past and Present European Initiatives, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521, 546 
(2007).  
 65. Brussels Convention, supra note 61, art. 24. See also Begley, supra note 64, at 547. 
 66. Beth Z. Shaw, Court Rules Against Cross-Border Enforcement of “European” Patent 
Rights, Legal Opinion Letter, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/100606shaw.pdf.  
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contracting states to be sued in any contracting state where one of the 
defendants is domiciled.67 Before long, the Netherlands became an 
attractive European forum for patent proprietors fighting infringement 
of patent equivalents in other countries.68 
Almost seventeen years after the Interlas decision, the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ,” now the Court of Justice for the European 
Union69) dealt a heavy blow to cross-border injunction practice in Roche 
Nederland v. Primus (“Roche”) and Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik 
mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG 
(“GAT”).70 As will be explained, Roche and GAT severely limited the 
practical ability for companies to consolidate enforcement proceedings 
when infringement is suspected in multiple countries. 
In Roche, two U.S. doctors, Primus and Goldenberg, sought 
consolidated infringement proceedings in Dutch courts against Roche 
Nederland BV and eight other companies in the Roche group.71 The 
eight non-Dutch companies in the Roche group contested the 
jurisdiction of the Dutch court.72 Citing Article 6(1) of the Brussels 
Convention, the lower court held that it had jurisdiction over all nine co-
defendants.73 The question was appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court, 
and then to the ECJ,74 which ultimately held that the dispositive rule was 
Article 2, which provides that “persons domiciled in a contracting state 
of the Brussels Convention must be sued in the courts of that state.”75 
According to the court, the Article 6(1) exception was inapposite 
because it only applies if the defendants’ acts were so connected that it 
would be “expedient to determine the actions together in order to avoid 
the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings.”76 Since patent rights must be considered in view of the 
                                                          
 67. Brussels Convention, supra note 61, art. 6(1). 
 68. Marketa Trimble, Emerging Scholar Series: Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. Patent 
Cases and Their Enforcement Abroad, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331, 357 (2009). 
 69. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union adopted a new institutional framework in which 
the court system of the European Union will be known as the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, or CJEU. The CJEU comprises three courts: the Court of Justice, the General Court and 
the Civil Service Tribunal. To avoid confusion, the abbreviation “ECJ” will continue to be used 
in this Note when referring to the Court of Justice within the CJEU.   
 70. Begley, supra note 64, at 525. 
 71. See Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535 at I-6575-76. 
 72. Begley, supra note 64, at 549. 
 73. Id. at 550. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Brussels Convention, supra note 61, art. 2. 
 76. Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. at I-6535. 
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relevant national law of each member state, divergent holdings on 
infringement could not be deemed to be “irreconcilable,” therefore 
rendering cross-border enforcement unavailable.77  
In GAT, the ECJ addressed a second stumbling block to patent 
enforcement—the issue of patent invalidity.78 The claimant GAT was 
competing with LuK to supply a third party company with a mechanical 
damper spring.79  LuK alleged that GAT was in breach of certain French 
patents of which it was the registered proprietor.80 GAT then filed suit in 
a German court requesting a declaration that LuK had no entitlement 
under the French patents and further that the patents were invalid.81 The 
German court held that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate both the 
infringement and invalidity issues, a matter which GAT appealed and 
thereafter referred to the ECJ.82 The ECJ held for GAT, reasoning that 
under Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention, the national courts of 
the granting state have exclusive jurisdiction as to patent validity.83 
Further, this exclusive jurisdiction applies irrespective of whether the 
party challenging the validity brought proceedings specifically to 
invalidate the patent, or merely as a defense to an infringement action.84 
This end result is inimical to centralized patent infringement 
proceedings, because accused patent infringers routinely assert 
invalidity of the patent as a defense.85 
In conclusion, the Roche and GAT cases highlight the reluctance of 
the ECJ to compromise the national interest of EU member states and 
raise legal considerations concerning these national interests that must 
                                                          
 77. Id. at I-6581. 
 78. Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und 
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509 at I-6526. 
 79. Id. at I-6528, ¶ 9. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
 83. Id. ¶ 22. 
 84. Begley, supra note 64, at 552. 
 85. Id. at 553. This case also foreshadows an obstacle in the enforcement of a modern 
unitary patent right, that of bifurcation. Bifurcation involves separating questions of patent 
validity from those of infringement into different proceedings, and is presently used in Germany. 
Since questions of infringement are generally decided more quickly than questions of invalidity, 
patentees tend to benefit. If unchecked, however, bifurcation can proliferate forum shopping and 
greater uncertainty in patent protection. See, e.g., Benjamin Henrion, EU Patent Plans are a Fuel 
for Patent Trolls, Says British Telecom, FFII.ORG (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://press.ffii.org/Press%20releases/EU%20patent%20plans%20are%20a%20fuel%20for%20pa
tent%20trolls%2C%20says%20British%20Telecom?action=print (on the potential effects of 
bifurcation on a unitary patent court system).  
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be addressed in synthesizing a unitary patent system. 
D.  A Fragmented Patent System is Detrimental  
to the European Economy 
On a fundamental level, the EU exists for three reasons: “to 
prevent war, to promote political unity, and for economic integration.”86  
These reasons cannot be considered independently, but rather flow 
together from the interaction and interests shared amongst the European 
countries. Based on these precepts, it can be shown that the absence of a 
unitary patent right in Europe severely damages economic integration, 
which is central to the EU itself.  
First, at the outset, the cost of obtaining community-wide patent 
protection can be prohibitively high under the present system. Consider, 
for example, the costs of patent protection in six European countries 
(Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom) vis-à-vis the United States. A May 2008 study indicated that 
the cumulative costs of procedural fees, translation costs, and renewal 
fees were about €9,000—four to six times more expensive than in the 
United States.87 This inequity is also understated, considering that this 
comparison substantially under-represents Europe by discounting the 
lack of patent protection in thirty-two of the thirty-eight countries. 88 If 
patent protection were extended to all EPC member states, such 
protection would cost at least fifteen times more than in the United 
States.89 As a result, even large multinational companies can be 
disinclined to file patents in many European countries.90 
The costs of parallel patent litigation are similarly exorbitant. 
According to a 2009 study, initiating patent litigation proceedings in 
just four European jurisdictions—Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom—could accrue total costs ranging from 
€310,000, if the case is resolved at the court of first instance, to €3.6 
million if accounting for the cost of appeal.91 These costs, which can be 
                                                          
 86. Bryony Jones, Why is Unity So Important to Europe? CNN (Nov. 4, 2011, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/04/world/europe/european-unity-explainer/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. 
 87. See Mejer, supra note 13. 
 88. Bruno van Pottelsberghe & Jérôme Danguy, Economic Cost-Benefits Analysis of the 
Community Patent 7, EUR. COMM’N (Sept. 7, 2012), 
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final_en.pdf. 
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about twice as high as in the United States, are prohibitive for many 
individuals and small- and medium-sized companies.92 Considering the 
totality of these factors, it is no surprise that many of these companies 
decide against pursuing patent protection altogether.93 Without the 
benefit of patent protection, many of these companies would just as well 
conduct their business and invest their capital elsewhere. 
Second, patent applicants in Europe must tolerate a dimension of 
uncertainty in patent enforcement that is substantially reduced in 
markets with integrated patent systems, such as the United States or 
Japan.94 This uncertainty is inherent to litigating patent rights separately 
in respective member states, since different courts can arrive at contrary 
conclusions on essentially the same facts.95As in the Euro banknotes 
case discussed in Part I, a duplicative and internally inconsistent patent 
system results in legal uncertainty and encourages forum shopping.96 
This is evidenced by a recent study showing about one thousand 
infringement cases per year in Germany, about 250 per year in France, 
about one hundred per year in Italy, about fifty in each of the UK and 
the Netherlands, with fourteen countries with fewer than ten cases per 
year, and nine countries with no cases per year.97 Forum shopping is 
undesirable because it leads to a system where the validity, 
enforceability and scope of patents are unpredictable.98 Even setting 
aside litigation costs, such a system can stall innovation because 
inventors and capitalists, being uncertain of the metes and bounds of 
patent protection, operate with reduced confidence that they will recoup 
expenditures in developing patented inventions.99 
Third, the present system suffers from the indirect effect of 
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 93. Straus, supra note 23, at 18. 
 94. Id. at 5. 
 95. Id. at 15. 
 96. See Begley, supra note 64, at 551. 
      97. Matthias Sontag, Das EuGH-Gutachten zur Europäischen Patentgerichtsbarkeit–
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community-wide exhaustion of patent rights.100 Patent exhaustion is a 
loss of patent right that occurs when a patented product is put on the 
market by the patent owner or with the patent owner’s consent.101 The 
ECJ has held that this patent exhaustion occurs simultaneously across 
the entire European Community when the patented product is placed in 
any EU member state.102 Once the owner’s patent rights are so 
“exhausted,” the product can freely circulate throughout the Community 
and even be re-imported into a country where the product is ostensibly 
protected by a valid patent.103 Without a Community Patent right, a 
patent owner seeking broad protection faces two unappealing 
alternatives: incur the inflated costs of obtaining patents in many 
European countries, or save costs by filing in just a few countries while 
conceding the right to exclude others from practicing their invention 
everywhere else.104 Today, under Community-wide patent exhaustion, a 
patent owner who decides to compete by placing products within a 
country without the benefit of patent protection not only faces a 
potential price war, but also the risk that any products sold will be 
legally imported into countries where the patent owner already has 
patent protection.105 
 In sum, businesses, particularly small and mid-sized companies, 
have encountered substantial hardship in enforcing their patents and in 
defending themselves against unfounded claims and patents that should 
arguably be revoked.106 As shown, despite best efforts to liberalize 
multinational patent enforcement, the lack of a unitary patent right in 
Europe has resulted in both uncertainty in the value of patent rights and 
inefficiencies in patent litigation. 
III. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES FRUSTRATE THE CREATION  
OF A UNITARY PATENT SYSTEM 
With the current economic plight in Europe, the problems 
highlighted in Part II have brought a sense of urgency for coherent 
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action by European countries.107 The Europe 2020 Strategy, for 
example, specifically identified the need for growth that is sustainable, 
inclusive, and based on knowledge and innovation.108 Proponents also 
argue that the principle of territoriality has shackled progressive patent 
reform for too long, and that it should give way to the commercial 
realities of an interconnected world.109 Yet, such reform should be 
balanced against EU law, which recognizes the prescriptive interests of 
the national member states in the European community.110 
The European community responded with a resurgence of drafts, 
revisions, and legal opinions directed to: (1) a unitary patent right, and 
(2) a dedicated Patent Court to enforce the unitary patent right.111 As 
will be shown, the unitary patent and the Patent Court are closely 
interdependent. The unitary patent needs a court system to administer 
cross-border enforcement,112 and the Patent Court needs a legally 
grounded unitary patent regulation to provide basic rules on jurisdiction 
and enforcement, as well as provisions for organizing and financing the 
system.113 
A. The Unitary Patent Regulation Must Harmonize the EPC  
and the Lisbon Treaty 
 It may be somewhat surprising that a unitary patent right was 
envisioned decades ago in Article 142 of the EPC, which allows for a 
group of contracting states to provide a patent right having “unitary 
character throughout their territories.”114 Just two years after the signing 
of the EPC, a unitary patent right formed the basis of a so-called 
Community Patent Convention, which provided a centralized grant 
procedure based on a uniform right and conducted in a single 
                                                          
 107. European Commission, EUROPE 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive 
Growth, at 2, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://eur-
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 109. Dinwoodie, supra note 56, at 734.  
 110. Id. at 732. 
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STRAWN LLP (Sept. 2011), 
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language.115 The Community Patent would confer “a protection right 
with a unitary character which has equal effect throughout the 
Community and can only be granted, assigned, annulled or extended in 
respect of the whole of the Community.”116 While this effort was borne 
amidst hopes that such a harmonized patent right would simplify 
infringement actions and reduce associated costs, the concept faced 
substantial challenges, and was never signed.117  
Probably the greatest source of frustration in ratifying the unitary 
patent is the problem of translations.118 For a community with twenty-
three official languages, this has historically been a quagmire fraught 
with administrative and political controversy.119 The dilemma is that full 
translations are needed (1) to meet the information function of patents 
and (2) to facilitate local enforcement. Yet providing translations in 
every country is unworkable from a cost perspective.120 A second 
problem stems from the fact that, while all EU members are also EPC 
members, the reverse is not true—as of this writing, Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, Turkey, Monaco, Iceland, amongst others, are members 
of the EPC but not the EU.121 Although a modernized Community 
Patent Regulation was proposed in 2000, it failed to adequately address 
either the language issue or the need for a patent judiciary for 
enforcement, and did not gain traction.122 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, it appears that the unitary patent 
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could still become a reality. Recent efforts were guided by a key 
provision in the Lisbon Treaty that expressly authorizes a unitary patent 
right.123   Article 118(1) allows the bicameral EU legislature, comprised 
of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
(“Council”), to act on legislative proposals by the European 
Commission (“Commission”) to establish European intellectual 
property rights “by means of regulations, acting in accordance with 
ordinary legislative procedure.”124 Article 118(2), however, requires that 
language arrangements would be established under a special legislative 
procedure by the Council acting unanimously after consulting the 
European Parliament.125 Thus, the translation arrangements for any 
unitary patent system in the EU must be established by a separate 
regulation.126 
Twin regulations directed to the unitary patent and translation 
arrangements were submitted to the Council in December 2009 and 
June 2010, respectively.127 Despite the best efforts by the Presidency of 
the Council to broker a deal on translations, talks collapsed128 when 
Spain and Italy objected to any regulation that did not provide for 
translations into their respective languages.129 To overcome this 
impasse, the Commission submitted a new proposal to the Council to 
authorize enhanced cooperation, a procedural tool that allows a subset 
of EU member states to conclude an agreement amongst themselves 
under certain conditions.130 In a major breakthrough, the Council 
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adopted the proposal in March 2011 and authorized twenty-five of the 
twenty-seven EU member states (Spain and Italy excluded) to 
implement enhanced cooperation in the area of unitary patent 
protection.131    
The current proposal would create a unitary patent, based on 
Articles 118(1) and 118(2), that operates alongside the current national 
and European patents and could be filed in any language of the EU. The 
unitary patent itself, however, would only be granted in one of the three 
official EU languages (English, German, and French).132 During a 
transitional period, further language translations could be triggered in 
the event of a dispute and would be paid for by the patent proprietor.133 
During this transitional period, machine translations would be 
aggressively developed with the objective of having, in time, the unitary 
patent available in the official language for every Member 
State.134Although Spain and Italy filed complaints with the ECJ 
challenging the Council’s authorization of enhanced cooperation, their 
resistance appears to have abated somewhat in recent months, leading 
some to express cautious optimism that one or both countries may soon 
drop their opposition.135 
B.  A New Patent Court System Must Comply with EU Law 
 On a second front, efforts were underway to create a patent court 
vested with the power to enforce a unitary patent right.136 The European 
Patent Litigation Agreement (“EPLA”) was a seminal effort. Frustrated 
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with the stalled efforts at the EU level, a Working Party on Litigation, 
formed from EPO member states, drafted the EPLA in November 
2003.137 The agreement would commit its signatory states to an 
integrated judicial system having a Court of First Instance and Appeal, 
with a central division and regional divisions.138 The agreement also 
obviated the requirement that states provide translations into their own 
languages so long as the patent specification was translated into an 
official EPO language (French, German or English).139 However, in 
2007, the Legal Service of the European Parliament concluded that the 
EPLA violated Article 292 of the then-prevailing EU treaty (Maastricht 
Treaty), since member states would have to contract to form the EPLA 
outside of EU governance.140 In hindsight, while the EPLA was 
ultimately a failure, it identified important legal issues that would shape 
future proposals. 
In 2007, the signing of the Lisbon Treaty breathed new life into the 
Patent Court project. Based on its interpretation of Article 118, the 
Commission constructed a draft agreement and statute that 
contemplated an integrated Patent Court with a Court of First Instance, 
a Court of Appeal and a Registry.141 Under the agreement, the Patent 
Court would be common to the contracting member states and have 
exclusive competence on their territories for both community patents 
and patents granted under the present EPC regime.142 The agreement 
also contained substantive provisions aimed at preventing inconsistent 
enforcement proceedings between different countries by harmonizing, 
for example, the definitions of infringing acts and indirect 
infringement.143 The Patent Court could refer questions to the ECJ 
concerning the interpretation of EU treaties or the validity and 
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the EU.144 ECJ decisions 
would be binding on the Patent Court to the extent that the decision 
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takes effect in a member state of the EU.145   
The ECJ soon brought down its gavel on the fledgling EPLA. 
Pursuant to a request by the Council, the ECJ issued a negative opinion 
in March 2011, stating that the proposal failed to comport with 
European Union law.146 According to the ECJ, the proposed Patent 
Court was “outside the institutional and judicial framework of the 
European Union” and had “a distinct legal personality under 
international law.”147 Because the draft agreement conferred exclusive 
jurisdiction on the proposed Patent Court, the courts of the member 
states would have been “divested of that jurisdiction,” and deprived of 
their power to refer questions to the ECJ in the field of patents.148 The 
ECJ concluded by noting that any viable patent system cannot “alter the 
essential character of the powers conferred on the institutions of the 
European Union and on the Member States which are indispensable to 
the preservation of the very nature of European Union law.”149 
Despite the unequivocal setback, proponents of the unitary patent 
project were undaunted, some even welcoming the points raised as 
providing “important clarification for the further development of the 
project.”150 Three months later, the Hungarian EU Council presidency 
published a revised version of the draft agreement on what is now 
known as the “Unified Patent Court” further revised by the Polish 
Presidency in September 2011.151 The revised draft contained specific 
provisions to address the ECJ objections, for example: (1) the 
contracting member states regard the Unified Patent Court to be part of 
the judicial system of the European Union and subject to the same 
obligations as a national court with regards to the respect of EU law, 
and (2) elimination of non-EU member states from the agreement such 
that the Patent Court is common only to EU member states.152 A flurry 
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of subsequent minor revisions culminated in a draft published by the 
Council in November 2011.153 
At the time of this writing, it is unclear whether or not the present 
draft will satisfy the ECJ. However, even if one were to accept these 
proposals, they raise an important checking question. Does the proposed 
unitary patent system, as amended, adequately address the fundamental 
problems that this project was originally intended to solve? To unpack 
this question, the proposed Patent Court will be juxtaposed with two 
exemplary judicial systems: (1) the U.S. Federal courts, and (2) the 
European Community design courts.154 The sections below will examine 
differences between these approaches in the particular context of the 
roles played by the courts, rates of precedential formation, and their 
resulting effects on quality control and legal certainty. 
IV.  THE COMMUNITY DESIGN COURTS AND THE U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 
BOTH IMPLEMENT A UNITARY PATENT SYSTEM, BUT THE FORMER 
PROVIDES SUPERIOR QUALITY CONTROL 
 The U.S. Federal courts are an independent national judiciary with 
jurisdiction over cases involving the laws and treaties of the United 
States, including patent law.155 The European Community design courts 
(“Community design courts”) are courts whose jurisdiction is confined 
to issues of infringement and invalidity for Community designs.156 
Although both courts enforce a unitary intellectual property right, the 
U.S. courts of first instance are generalist courts while the Community 
design courts are specialized. As will be shown, this distinction is 
significant because the limited jurisdiction of the latter tends to promote 
greater legal certainty in enforcement. Accordingly, the Community 
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design approach is better situated to achieve the goals of a unitary 
patent system, although compliance with EU law would require further 
modifications to this system.   
A.  The U.S. Federal Court Model Achieves a Unified System but 
Encourages Forum Shopping 
The current U.S. patent litigation regime provides a useful parallel 
model for analyzing the merits of litigating a unitary patent in the 
national courts of European member states. Under the U.S. model, 
federal district courts are the courts of first instance for cases involving 
laws of the United States, including patent cases.157 In patent cases, 
district court appeals go to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”), an appellate court with nationwide jurisdiction in 
enumerated subject areas.158 Intellectual property cases comprise about 
30% of CAFC cases, nearly all of them involving patents.159 Because the 
CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from U.S. district courts 
concerning matters of patent law, it provides a check on these courts.160 
Established in 1982, the CAFC was commissioned “to promote 
greater uniformity in certain areas of federal jurisdiction and relieve the 
pressure on the dockets of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals 
for the regional circuits.”161 In part, this court eliminates some 
“inconsistencies in the application and interpretation of patent law 
across federal courts.”162 The CAFC role in harmonizing patent law 
across the federal court system may be partially reflected in an increase 
in settlement rates associated with patent cases, because harmonization 
inherently increases legal certainty, which in turn reduces the need for 
litigation.163 For example, following the establishment of the CAFC, the 
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time for arriving at a settlement decreased by 7.8 months (which is, 
depending on the type of patent involved, roughly one third to one half 
of the ex ante settlement time).164 
One way to measure the quality, and associated credibility, of a 
court is to examine the rate at which the rulings of that court are 
reversed on appeal.165 By this metric, the high rate of reversals by the 
CAFC of district court decisions on the construction of patent claims 
may be cause for concern.166 A recent study reported that the CAFC 
reversed on the basis of erroneous claim construction about forty 
percent of the time, even as its overall reversal rate ranged from eleven 
to fourteen percent.167 Reversal rates are meaningful, particularly when 
comparing the merits of different judicial approaches, because a high 
likelihood of reversal adds uncertainty in patent litigation.168 Mindful 
that patent law operates within commercial law, such legal uncertainty 
not only contravenes a stated object of the unitary patent system, but 
also chills the business activity of patent practitioners and potential 
infringers alike, which rely on certainty over claim scope to make 
timely business decisions.169 
A factor contributing to this problem may be the lack of judicial 
precedent in most U.S. district courts.170 For example, in the twelve-
month period ending September 30, 2010, there were about 361 
thousand total civil and criminal filings across the United States, and 
                                                                                                                 
Discussion Paper No. 6946 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401775 (modeling that 
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because of less uncertainty about the outcome if the dispute goes to trial). 
 164. Id. at 20–21. 
 165. See James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the 
United States, 1 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 101, 103 (2007), available at 
http://www.jltp.uiuc.edu/archives/holderman.pdf (on the ramifications of high reversal rates, 
namely the erosion of trust in the lower court claim construction rulings and reluctance of 
disappointed litigants to settle). 
 166. See id. 
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 http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2012). 
 167. See id. (showing that over the 12-month period ending September 30 of each year from 
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 168. See Holderman & Guren, supra note 165, at 102; Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping 
In Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?,79 N.C.L. REV. 889, 927 (2001). 
 169. See September 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 146, at 7; Galasso & Schankerman, 
supra note 163, at 1 (noting that, in patent disputes, delay and uncertainty in the settlement and 
licensing process mean slower diffusion of patented technology). 
 170. See Holderman & Guren, supra note 165, at 104–05. 
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less than one percent (i.e., about 3,300) of those cases involved 
patents.171 The lack of subject matter specialization is noteworthy, since 
U.S. district court judges deal with a large and diverse caseload and 
typically do not concentrate on staying abreast of the changing nuances 
of any one area of the law, such as patent law.172 Some have surmised 
that the large caseload confronting district court judges may be further 
exacerbating the problem.173 
A related problem with the U.S. approach is that different courts of 
first instance use different judicial procedures, resulting in considerable 
variation in speeds of adjudication and patentee win rates from district 
to district.174 These factors provide strong incentives for forum 
shopping, even in the integrated U.S. patent system.175 For example, the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Marshall, Texas 
has long been a popular forum for patent lawsuits, since it found in 
favor of the plaintiff seventy-sight percent of the time, compared to a 
national average of fifty-nine percent.176 Even when the merits favor the 
defendant in a patent case, a strongly pro-plaintiff forum can put great 
pressure on the defendant to settle matters quickly and privately.177 Such 
an outcome would be contrary to the goals of the unitary patent 
Regulation and Patent Court agreement, namely providing a patent with 
unitary character and providing “uniform protection,” with “equal effect 
in all participating Member States.”178 
B.  The Community Design Model Improves upon the U.S. Model by 
Promoting Legal Certainty  
Turning now to the Community design regime, it is interesting to 
note that Europe has already set a legal precedent for integrating 
European intellectual property rights through EU institutions. For 
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example, in 1995, Community legislation established the Community 
Plant Variety Office to protect a unitary plant variety right throughout 
Europe.179 This was followed shortly thereafter by the Community 
Trademark in 1996.180 Administered by the Office for Harmonization in 
the Internal Market, a EU agency, this trademark right also enjoys 
Community-wide effect.181 The Community design came into being 
soon after. 
The Community design bears some similarities to both patents and 
trademarks. Like patents, the design is a form of intellectual property.182     
Legally, the design represents the outward appearance of a product or 
part of it, resulting from the lines, contours, colors, shape, texture, 
materials, and/or ornamentation.183 An application to register a 
Community design requires a request for registration, information 
identifying the applicant and a representation of a design, typically 
based on one or more illustrations.184 To be valid, a Community design 
must be novel and have “individual character.”185 Unlike patent 
applications, however, designs are only examined for compliance with 
formalities; no substantive search is conducted at the time of 
application.186 Designs also differ from patent rights in that they cover 
the appearance of a product, rather than its function.187 Designs have 
emerged as an established component in the portfolio of major 
industries, such as clothing, automobiles, jewelry, and furniture.188 
                                                          
 179. See The Mission of the CVPO, CMTY. PLANT VARIETY OFF, 
http://www.cpvo.europa.eu/main/en/home/about-the-cpvo/its-mission (last visited Oct. 6, 2012); 
see also Council Regulation (EC) On Community Plant Variety Rights, July 27, 1994, 1994 O.C. 
(L 227) 1 (governing the system of Community plant variety protection). 
 180. See Timothy W. Blakely, Beyond The International Harmonization of Trademark Law: 
The Community Trade Mark as a Model of Unitary Transnational Trademark Protection, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 309, 338 (2000). 
 181. See id. at 338–39. 
 182. What Is a Design?, OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INT. MKT. (May 28, 2008), 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/design.en.do [hereinafter OHIM]. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Guidelines for the Examination of Community Designs, OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION INT. 
MKT. 4 (Aug. 7, 2008), 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/legalReferences/guidelines.en/office/aspects/pdf/Exam
Guidelines.pdf.do. 
 185. Examination Guidelines Community Design, OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION INT. MKT. 8 
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In 2001, the Council of the EU promulgated by regulation “a 
unified system for obtaining a Community design to which uniform 
protection is given with uniform effect throughout the entire territory of 
the Community.”189 The Community design system also addresses 
problems that are common to those of the unitary patent, including 
differences between laws of member states which prevent and distort 
Community-wide competition, and divisions of the internal market that 
pose obstacles to the free movement of goods.190 
Under the Community design regime, and unlike the U.S. model, 
the existing national courts do not adjudicate on design matters; instead, 
member states designate in their territories a limited number of national 
courts and tribunals of first and second instance (Community design 
courts) that perform the functions assigned to them.191 These 
Community design courts have exclusive jurisdiction for matters of 
infringement and invalidity of Community designs.192 These courts have 
the power to impose both injunctions and damages that have effect 
throughout the EU.193  
The designation of a specialized court has several important 
consequences. Recall that only a small fraction of cases heard by U.S. 
district courts each year are patent cases.194 By comparison, all of the 
cases heard in Community design courts involve Community designs. It 
can be inferred that, between the two court systems, the Community 
design courts will have a much richer body of precedent, since a 
specialized court will generally hear the same legal issue at a 
considerably higher rate than a non-specialized court.195 Second, it can 
be inferred that judges sitting on a specialized court will have greater 
exposure and opportunity to develop expertise required to properly 
adjudicate the legal issues at hand, leading to a higher degree of 
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consistency and predictability.196 
 Assuming that a court’s reversal rate on appeal is probative of its 
perceived quality and credibility,197 empirical data indeed corroborates 
the virtues of a specialized court. Compared with the U.S. district 
courts, whose rulings on patent claims were reversed about forty percent 
of the time, the reversal rates for decisions by Community design courts 
of first instance were, on average, only seventeen percent for ex parte 
decisions and twenty-eight percent for inter partes decisions over the 
last five years—a telling statistic that favors the Community design 
approach.198 Some might attribute this difference to the intrinsic 
differences between patents and designs.199 Yet, court statistics 
exclusive to the U.S. patent regime also bolster this conclusion. For 
example, after the United States established the CAFC following a 
period of fragmented patent rights, the average settlement delay in 
patent litigation fell by a statistically significant difference.200 These 
numbers strongly indicate the benefits of a specialized court in 
providing a predictable legal outcome. 
C. A Modified Community Design Approach Would Provide a Viable 
Solution in Europe 
The September 2011 draft Patent Court agreement and statute, in 
conjunction with the current unitary patent Regulation, essentially 
elected the Community design approach over the U.S. model, most 
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significantly in the structure of its courts of first instance.201 For 
example, like the Community design courts, the proposed Patent Court 
would be common to the Contracting Member States, yet it would be 
treated vis-à-vis the ECJ as a national court for which the member states 
are responsible.202 Also similar to Community design courts, the 
proposed Patent Courts would be specialized in matters of patent law 
and be composed of judges who are both legally and technically 
qualified.203  
The proposed Patent Court framework raises a jurisdictional issue 
reminiscent of Roche and GAT.204 The new Patent Court would deviate 
from the Brussels I Regulation’s basic principle that jurisdiction is to be 
exercised by the EU country in which the defendant is domiciled, 
regardless of nationality.205 The new Patent Court, which has a legal 
personality distinct from the national courts, should be harmonized with 
this principle.206 This issue could be resolved by naming the new Patent 
Court in the Brussels I Regulation as the national court of each state 
participating in the Patent Court Agreement.207 
 There are other important structural differences, setting the 
proposed Patent Court apart from either of the aforementioned judicial 
systems.208 One major difference relates to the competence and role of 
the ECJ in the work of the specialized court.209 For example, the 
decisions of Community design courts can be brought before the ECJ 
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following a decision by the Board of Appeal, with the ECJ having full 
jurisdiction “to annul or alter the contested decision.”210 On the other 
hand, the competence of the ECJ would be uniquely tailored under the 
proposed Patent Court system, since the Patent Court would be 
adjudicating rules under the EPC to which the ECJ does not adhere, 
including questions of patentability and revocation.211 The ECJ would, 
however, be competent to rule on matters of injunctions and limitations 
thereof as contained in Article 3(2) of the proposed unitary patent 
Regulation.212 While there has been vociferous debate over the extent of 
ECJ involvement, particularly as to Articles 6 through 8 of the proposed 
Regulation, the ECJ would, in theory, play a fairly limited role in 
adjudicating technical matters in patent law, with the brunt of the work 
being borne by the Patent Court.213 
Based on the latest draft of the Patent Court agreement, the Patent 
Court would also differ from U.S. courts and Community design courts 
in its unique multinational court composition.214 Under the agreement, a 
local division panel would include at least one permanent legally 
qualified judge who is a national of the contracting member state 
hosting the local division, and at least one judge from an international 
“pool” of judges.215 Article 5 further promotes the internationality of the 
court—for a local division to be set up in a member state, over one 
hundred patent cases per year must be commenced in that member state 
in three successive years prior to or subsequent to the date of entry into 
force.216  If individual member states cannot meet this condition, the 
agreement provides for regional divisions, which also have 
multinational composition and are shared by two or more member 
states.217 The international character of the Patent Court is significant 
because judges can benefit from cross-border interaction between 
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similarly situated professionals, judges, administrators, and lawyers.218 
Such conversations, in turn, can lead to “soft” harmonization, inculcated 
by the socially driven convergence of ideas instead of being imposed by 
the rule of law.219 
Indeed, the greatest problem faced by the unitary patent may not 
be legal, but, rather, practical in nature. For the unitary patent to be 
considered a long-term success, it must attract the interest of patent 
proprietors who might otherwise be reasonably happy with the status 
quo.220 There are palpable reasons for why a proprietor would be 
reluctant to embrace the unitary patent. Change begets uncertainty, and 
the specter of a Community-wide revocation by a rogue court in a 
distant member state could give pause to those considering sweeping 
changes to their intellectual property policy.221 Patent enforcement is 
also rife with language issues, including questions of the operational 
language of the division, proceedings, court documents and 
judgments.222 Some member states have raised legitimate concerns that 
their nationals may not be able to use their own language in the 
proposed Patent Court, or that judgments may not be available in their 
native language.223 Finally, the costs related to the complex language 
requirements and operations of the Patent Court are also largely 
uncertain.224 With these risks, even diversified multinational companies 
may adopt a “wait and see” approach before including unitary patents in 
their portfolios.  
For all of these reasons, it is of paramount importance that the 
unitary patent is of utmost quality. The need to empower the EPO and 
the proposed Patent Court to provide adequate quality control for the 
unitary patent cannot be understated because its success ultimately rests 
on a cost-benefit calculation by those seeking patent protection.225 In 
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this analysis, patent-seekers weigh the unitary patent against its 
alternatives, including the currently existing European and National 
patents.226 The patent-seeker balances the costs of obtaining a patent 
with later-arising transaction costs, including: (1) uncertainties in patent 
protection, (2) litigation inefficiency, and (3) licensing transaction 
costs.227 As will be shown, these costs are directly or indirectly 
dependent on the quality of the patents granted and the quality of their 
enforcement. 
First, some patent protection transaction costs derive from the risk 
of the EPO granting an overbroad patent claim or the Patent Court 
making inconsistent rulings. In this respect, the proposed unitary patent 
is primed for success. The EPO is the logical choice to administer the 
unitary patent, given its successful track record, dating back to 1973, as 
the granting authority for European patents under the EPC.228 The 
proposed Regulation wisely leverages existing infrastructure for patent 
prosecution, while preserving post-grant EPO procedures such as 
limitation, revocation, and opposition proceedings, with appeals going 
to the Boards of Appeal.229 As to enforcement, the Patent Court, with its 
patent-specialized judges, should be well situated to provide increased 
certainty in claim construction and enhance public confidence in the 
unitary patent.230 There will be, no doubt, some degree of uncertainty 
during an adjustment period establishing any new court system. Costs 
associated thereof will offset, to some degree, the benefits of the Patent 
Court, but these are short-term issues that will dissipate over time. 
Second, the EPO/Patent Court plays a role in maintaining litigation 
efficiency.231 It is not surprising that litigation efficiency directly 
correlates with legal certainty, since certainty over patent validity and 
claim scope facilitates negotiation between litigants, settlement of 
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certain issues, and appropriate tailoring of other issues.232 Accordingly, 
high-quality examinations of patent claims, both by the EPO and the 
Patent Court, are essential to providing a strong presumption of patent 
validity and minimizing litigation over questionable patent claims.233 
Reducing litigation time, in turn, will decrease transaction costs 
between negotiating parties in patent infringement disputes.234 
Finally, transaction costs take the form of clearance costs imposed 
on commercial activity. A company planning to do business in a given 
member state will need to conduct a thorough search of applicable, 
granted European and unitary patents in case licenses are required to 
practice its business.235 Questionable patent rights cannot be easily 
valued and they erode efficiency of the market for licensing patents, 
eventually impacting the cross-fertilization of technology between small 
and medium-sized entities that specialize in radical innovation, and 
large companies that develop, produce, and market those innovations.236 
As before, a specialized Patent Court is more likely to arrive at 
consistent outcomes from one member state to another than a non-
specialized court.  
Transactional costs must therefore be kept under control to provide 
an affordable system and encourage widespread acceptance of the 
unitary patent by multinational companies, as well as small and 
medium-sized entities.237 Acceptance of the unitary patent by patent 
proprietors will generate fee revenue, thereby defraying the incremental 
costs incurred by the EPO in processing unitary patent applications, 
collecting renewal fees, maintaining a registry, and managing the 
compensation system for translation costs.238 Just as importantly, 
                                                          
 232. See Zhai, supra note 225, at 427. 
 233. Id. at 428. 
 234. Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 163, at 1. 
 235. Zhai, supra note 225, at 428. 
 236. Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 163, at 1 (describing the importance of patent 
transactions in high technology areas). 
 237. See Straus, supra note 23. 
 238. Benoît Battistelli, Address at the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 
Hearing:  On the Threshold of Unitary Patent Protection in Europe (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.epo.org/news-issues/press/speeches/20111011.html. [hereinafter Battistelli Address]. 
While translation costs may be considerable in the short term, Article 6 of the proposed Unitary 
Patent Regulation provides for transitional measures to be applied during a certain period, before 
a system of high quality machine translations into all official languages of the Union becomes 
available.  Recently, the EPO has reported progress on a machine translation program that is 
expected, by 2014, to provide translations from English, French and German into 28 European 
languages plus Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Russian. Technology could thus drive down 
translation costs significantly over time.  
  
2012] Enforcing a Unitary Patent in Europe 87 
 
successful outcomes will encourage the future participation of member 
states not initially part of the unitary patent project.239  
V.  THE PROPOSED PATENT COURT AGREEMENT HARMONIZES THE EPC 
AND EU LAW, BUT ITS LONG-TERM SUCCESS REQUIRES TRUST BETWEEN 
THE PATENT COURT AND THE ECJ 
Opponents of the unitary patent project have seized on the ECJ 
ruling to urge that the unitary patent should not involve the EPO and 
instead be fully administered within EU institutions.240 An opposite tack 
was taken by proponents of the unitary patent, who have argued that the 
Regulation should be re-crafted to curtail ECJ involvement in 
substantive matters of the Patent Court.241 This Note advances the 
opinion that both of these viewpoints are mistaken, and the proposed 
unitary patent Regulation and Patent Court agreement are in full 
compliance with EU law. 
A.  The Lisbon Treaty Contemplates Administration and Enforcement of 
the Unitary Patent by Non-EU Institutions 
One vocal critic of the proposed Regulation and Patent Court 
agreement is April, a French advocacy association devoted to promoting 
a democratic innovation policy in Europe.242 April argues that the March 
2011 ECJ opinion plainly demonstrates that (1) patent-related litigation 
must be dealt with by national courts in each member state, and (2) the 
primacy of EU law is incompatible with non-EU institutions ruling on 
matters that affect the fundamental rights of European citizens.243 Each 
of these points will be examined in turn. 
The first issue is jurisdictional. In the ECJ opinion, the court held 
that “since that jurisdiction [to rule on direct actions between 
individuals in the field of patents] is held by the courts of the Member 
States . . . . the Member States cannot confer the jurisdiction to resolve 
such disputes on a court created by an international agreement.”244  
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Since this reasoning was based on Article 267 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
concerning preliminary rulings by the ECJ, the question of jurisdiction 
turns on whether the courts in the current Patent Court agreement 
constitute courts “of the Member States” according to the purview of 
Article 267.245 The following two cases illuminate this issue. 
In Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora, decided in 1997, Parfums 
Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV (collectively, “Dior”) 
filed an infringement action against Evora BV (“Evora”) in a district 
court of the Netherlands for using Dior’s trademarks to market perfume 
products.246 While the district court granted Dior’s application, Evora 
appealed to the Regional Court in Amsterdam, which reversed.247 After 
another appeal, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands stayed the 
proceedings and requested clarification from the ECJ as to what 
constitutes a “court or tribunal of the Member State against whose 
decisions there is no remedy under national law,” under Article 177 of 
the EC Treaty (the predecessor to Article 267 TFEU).248 Citing the 
establishment of the tri-national Benelux Court of Justice in 1975, the 
ECJ held that “[t]here is no good reason why such a court, common to a 
number of Member States, should not be able to submit questions to this 
Court, in the same way as courts or tribunals of any of those Member 
States.”249 According to the ECJ, “[t]o allow a court . . . faced with the 
task of interpreting Community rules in the performance of its function, 
to follow the procedure provided for by Article 177 of the Treaty would 
therefore serve the purpose of that provision, which is to ensure the 
uniform interpretation of Community law.”250  
This ruling was recently qualified by a 2011 case, Miles v. 
                                                                                                                 
2011_C1_09EN.pdf.  
 245. See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 267. 
 246. Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013, I-6036–38, 
available at http://0-
www.heinonline.org.lucy.lls.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.intyb/rcbjcofi0082&id=9&collection=i
ntyb&index=intyb/rcbjcofi. 
 247. Id. at I-6038. 
 248. Id. at I-6039–40; see also Treaty of Rome, supra note 20, art. 177; TFEU, supra note 22, 
art. 267.  
 249. Id. ¶ 21 (the Benelux Court is an instrument of the Benelux Economic Union created by 
the Benelux Treaty of 1958 to foster economic cooperation between Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands. The Benelux Court helps promote uniformity in the application of rules of law 
common to Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands by way of preliminary ruling, and has 
jurisdiction in administrative cases. See Benelux CJ – Court Of Justice of the Benelux Economic 
Union, PICT-PCTI (last visited Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/beneluxCJ.html). 
 250. Id. ¶ 23. 
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European Schools, in which a group of teachers filed suit against the 
European schools because the schools refused to adjust their 
remuneration following depreciation of the pound sterling against other 
currencies.251 The European Schools’ Convention, upon which the 
schools were based, provided a Complaints Board (“Board”) with “sole 
jurisdiction in the first and final instance . . . in any dispute concerning 
the application of this Convention to all persons covered by it with the 
exception of administrative and ancillary staff, and regarding the 
legality of any act based on the Convention or rules made under it.”252 
The Board stayed the proceedings and referred a threshold question to 
the ECJ: Is the Board, being common to the member states but not 
falling directly within the authority of any particular member state, 
competent to refer questions to the ECJ?253 The ECJ answered in the 
negative, ruling that while the Board was a “court or tribunal” within 
the meaning of Article 267, it does not have judicial links with the 
judicial systems of the member states and thus should not be able to 
submit questions to the Court of Justice.254 
 Here, the proposed Patent Court agreement provides for a court 
system with jurisdiction over all contracting member states of the 
agreement in matters concerning unitary patents.255 As indicated in the 
draft agreement, the Patent Court should be considered competent to ask 
preliminary questions on the basis of Article 267 TFEU now that (1) 
non-EU member states have been removed from the agreement and (2) 
the Patent Court is common only to the member states of the 
agreement.256 Like the Benelux Court in Dior, the Patent Court is 
“common to a number of member states,” and thus should be competent 
to refer questions to the ECJ “in the same way as courts or tribunals of 
those member states.”257  
Under the latest revision of the proposed Patent Court agreement, 
the Patent Court also should not be restricted under the purview of the 
Miles case, because the Patent Court has at least one judicial link with 
the national courts under the proposed Patent Court agreement.258 For 
                                                          
 251. See Case C-196/09, Paul Miles v. European Schools, 2011 E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 2, available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0196:EN:HTML. 
 252. Id. ¶ 8. 
 253. Id. ¶ 30–31. 
 254. Id. ¶ 41. 
 255. See November 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 153, at 4.  
 256. Id. 
      257.   Id. 
 258. Id. at 5. 
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example, Article 14c of the draft agreement expressly provides that 
“Contracting Member States are jointly and severally liable for damages 
. . . resulting from an infringement of Union law by the Court of 
Appeal,” and that “[a]ny action seeking compensation for such damage 
shall be brought against the Contracting Member State where the 
claimant is domiciled before the competent court of that Contracting 
State (emphasis added).”259 Since the national courts of the contracting 
member states would decide issues of infringement of Union law by the 
Patent Court, the Patent Court should be competent under Article 267 to 
refer questions to the ECJ.260 
The second question concerns the involvement of the EPO, a non-
EU institution, in administering the unitary patent. Critics such as April 
have characterized the EPO as an unchecked, “anti-democratic” 
institution whose proposed role would be contrary to EU law.261 These 
objections are without merit. Whether the EPO can administer the 
unitary patent is a legal question that essentially rests on the compliance 
of the unitary patent Regulation with Article 118 of the Lisbon 
Treaty.262 Article 97a states the following: 
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish 
measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to 
provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout 
the Union and for the setting up of centralised [sic] Union-wide 
authorisation [sic], coordination and supervision arrangements.263 
On its face, there is nothing in the above text that limits the 
“creation of the European intellectual property rights” to EU 
institutions. Moreover, no such limitation can be implied based on the 
intent of the framers of the Lisbon Treaty, because the framers would 
have had full knowledge of the EPC and the central role of the EPO 
since the signing of the European Patent Convention in 1973.264  The 
negative opinion of the Legal Service of the European Parliament 
                                                          
 259. Id. art. 14(c). Article 14(c) further provides that where the claimant is not domiciled in a 
Contracting Member State, it may bring such an action against the Contracting Member State 
where the Court of Appeal has its seat, before the competent court of that Contracting Member 
State. Id.  
 260. Id. at 5. 
 261. Tadeusz, supra note 240. 
 262. See Tilmann, supra note 199, at 3. 
 263. See TFEU, supra note 22, at 71. 
 264. See supra II; Tilmann, supra note 199, at 4. 
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concerning the EPLA is no longer a basis for rejecting the Regulation, 
since Article 118 is an exception to Article 344, confining 
“interpretation or application of the Treaties” to the “ordinary” courts 
within the EU legal order.265 In brief, the contention that the EPO role in 
the proposed Patent Court is incompatible with EU law merely because 
it is a non-EU institution is highly doubtful.  
B.  The Exclusion of the ECJ in Matters of Substantive  
Patent Law is Not Viable 
Even some proponents of the Patent Court voiced opposition to the 
draft agreement, arguing that the Patent Court should have the final say 
in patent matters. A unanimous resolution of the Intellectual Property 
Judges Association stated that Articles 6 through 8, concerning matters 
of direct infringement, indirect infringement, and limitations thereof, 
should be jettisoned from the Regulation to exclude the ECJ from 
adjudication of substantive patent law.266 According to the resolution, 
their inclusion would result in the new system failing to realize the goal 
of a better patent litigation system in Europe.267 Professor Robin Jacob, 
who is of this view, commented that inclusion of Articles 6 through 8 in 
the Regulation would be “disastrous,” with the non-specialized ECJ 
upsetting the judicial process, causing delays, and promoting 
uncertainty.268  
Despite some impassioned protests against ECJ inclusion,269 
wholesale exclusion of the ECJ role in the unitary patent project is 
unlikely to occur, for two reasons: (1) the Lisbon Treaty provision 
contemplates an active EU role in “uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights,” and (2) the ECJ is unlikely to concede competence 
since it has already held elements of patent law to be part of the EU 
legal order. 
First, Article 118 of the Lisbon Treaty appears to explicitly 
mandate involvement of EU institutions in substantive patent law by 
setting out that any unitary patent Regulation should “establish 
                                                          
 265. See TFEU, supra note 22, arts. 118, 344. 
 266. See Draft Unitary Patent Regulation, supra note 123, arts. 6–8; Robin Jacob, President 
of the Intellectual Prop. Judges Ass’n, Letter of Resolution (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/2011/November/Venice%2020Judges%2020Resolution%2020
2011%5B1%5D.pdf. 
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measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to 
provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the 
Union.”270 In one construction, Article 118 can only be used as a legal 
basis for the unitary patent Regulation if the Regulation contains 
provisions for “uniform protection” of intellectual property rights.271 
Read more expansively, the Article merely requires that the proposed 
Regulation create a basis of a unitary right, without mandating that EU 
law govern this right.272  As between these two constructions, only the 
former is plausible. The signing parties to the Lisbon Treaty, keenly 
aware of the multinational enforcement problem of the GAT and Roche 
cases earlier discussed, would have objectively understood Article 118 
to be calling for an active EU role in establishing “uniform 
protection.”273  This is further supported by the official EU press release 
accompanying the Lisbon Treaty, stating that “if the EU legislator 
decides to make use of [Article 118], it could allow overcoming the 
present fragmentation of the EU in twenty-seven national copyright 
regimes (emphasis added),”274 as well as the existence of Community 
design courts created under Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002. 
 Second, the ECJ has previously suggested that substantive patent 
law is part of EU law, and hence part of its jurisdiction. In its March 
2011 opinion, for example, the ECJ declared that the creation of the 
Patent Court would deprive national courts and tribunals of the power, 
or obligation, to refer questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling in 
the field of patents.275 Implicit in this language is the assumption that 
patent law should be integrated with EU law to allow referrals to 
operate within the EU judicial framework.276 Such an assumption is also 
consistent with the involvement of the ECJ in intellectual property 
matters today.277 
                                                          
 270. See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 118. 
 271. Tilmann, supra note 199, at 4. 
 272. See Opinion of Rt. Hon. Professor Sir Robin Jacob (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
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 275. See March 2011 ECJ Opinion, supra note 244. 
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The ability, and obligation, of the Patent Court to refer questions to 
the ECJ for preliminary rulings in matters of infringement potentially 
adds uncertainty to the unitary patent system. In the long term, however, 
substantial benefits may arise from a counterbalance to the power of the 
Patent Court of Appeal. Once again, the CAFC provides a case in point. 
Since its inception, the CAFC has generally expanded patent-eligible 
subject matter and strengthened patent rights, developing a reputation as 
a pro-patent court.278 The same may occur in Europe. The danger is that 
a specialized court runs the risk of being myopic; by focusing on highly 
technical patent cases day in and day out, it may not appreciate the full 
breadth of nuanced policy interests as well as a court of more general 
jurisdiction. These reasons may help explain the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent willingness to intervene in patent law cases.279 Thus, provided 
that the ECJ restrains itself, it can provide a valuable check on the 
Patent Court by clarifying matters of interpretation that could have 
adverse ancillary effects on the functioning of the EU. 
Notable European judges and patent practitioners have also 
lambasted the prospect of ECJ involvement that could result in a 
massively inefficient, unpredictable and expensive court system, calling 
the package, as a whole, “worse than the system it is meant to 
                                                                                                                 
18, 2011), available 
at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=81836&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&cid=620544 (ruling that an invention will not be patentable if the 
subject matter of the patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos or their 
use as a base material);  C-281/10P, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grupo Promer Mon Graphic SA, 2011 
E.C.R. ¶ 53, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0281:EN:NOT (where the ECJ 
defined an “informed user” as referring not to a user of average attention, but to a particularly 
observant one, based on personal experience or extensive knowledge of the sector in question). 
 278. See, e.g., Mireles, supra note 98, at 718 (noting that whereas the circuit courts had 
affirmed sixty-two percent of district-court findings of patent infringement in the three decades 
before the creation of the CAFC, the CAFC in its first eight years affirmed 90 percent of such 
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only 12 percent of the cases. In the first eight years of the Federal Circuit, 28 percent of these 
cases were reversed.); Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of a 
Centralized Judiciary, Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 
441 (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary]. 
 279. As a fairly recent U.S. example, consider eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the CAFC, holding that an injunction should not automatically issue 
based on a finding of patent infringement, but also that an injunction should not be denied simply 
on the basis that the plaintiff does not practice the patented invention. eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
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improve.”280 This fatalistic and false choice between achieving the goals 
of the unitary patent project and acceding to ECJ jurisdiction should be 
rejected. First, this view discounts any possibility of procedural solution 
to the aforementioned inefficiencies. The Patent Court agreement itself 
sets out rules of procedure adopted by the Administrative Committee 
that “shall guarantee that the decisions of the Court are of the highest 
quality and that proceedings are organised in the most efficient and cost 
effective manner (emphasis added).”281 Such rules could conceivably 
inform, for example, how questions are qualified and consolidated and 
cabin the scope of referrals to the ECJ. Second, many of the particularly 
murky issues raised by the Regulation, such as patent assignments, 
voluntary and compulsory licenses, and government use, are expressly 
reserved as matters of domestic law for the participating member 
states,282 and thus are likely to fall outside the purview of the ECJ in 
most disputes.283  Lastly, the ECJ does not operate within a vacuum, and 
could plausibly adapt to provide a coherent jurisprudence. For example, 
comity with the Patent Court could lead the ECJ to undergo reform,284 or 
at least temper its judicial activism so as to minimize legal interpretation 
conflict.285 
 While some growing pains are to be expected in any new legal 
regime, necessity will drive the convergence of jurisprudence allowing 
the Patent Court and ECJ to peacefully co-exist in the enforcement of a 
unitary patent. Sharing this responsibility will require mutual trust 
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between the two judicial institutions. On one hand, the ECJ must trust 
that the Patent Court does not allow questionable patents and associated 
litigation to proliferate.286 On the other hand, the Patent Court must trust 
the ECJ to tread lightly, especially concerning matters fundamental to 
patent law.287 It is insightful that the U.S. Supreme Court has largely 
avoided interference with the CAFC over its first 24 years of operation, 
thus giving the latter court time to establish its own jurisprudence.288 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Recent developments on the unitary patent regulation have not 
been bereft of drama. At the June 2012 European Council summit, 
unitary patent proponents triumphantly eliminated a major stumbling 
block only to resurrect yet another controversy.289 Both the European 
Council and the EPO ebulliently reported that negotiations at the 
summit had produced a “historic breakthrough.”290 In spite of the 
pending legal challenges filed by Spain and Italy291 and much internal 
squabbling over the location of the Central Division of the Unified 
Patent Court,292 negotiating member states (minus Spain and Italy) 
finally came to a compromise—Paris would be the seat of the Court’s 
central division and specialized clusters would be established in Munich 
and London.293 But with so-called “eurosceptics” and industry advocates 
leading the charge, the Council also issued in their Conclusions what is 
likely to be construed as a provocative declaration of mistrust of the 
ECJ:  “We suggest that Articles 6 to 8 of the Regulation implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
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protection . . . be deleted.”294 With the Patent Court agreement still 
being negotiated by a sub-committee of the European Parliament mostly 
behind closed doors,295 legal wrangling over the Council’s 
recommendation will continue apace.   
Notwithstanding the fate of Articles 6 through 8 in the current 
Regulation, European patent reform is imperative and the consequences 
of inaction loom large. The current economic crisis plaguing the 
fragmented European community underscores the need for a unitary 
patent and an integrated patent court to encourage innovation and 
investment, promote the free movement of goods and services 
throughout the internal market, and reduce litigation costs. Yet, in spite 
of the momentum generated by successful pan-European integration of 
intellectual property rights in the areas of plant varieties, trademarks, 
and most recently, designs, a battery of legal issues borne from 
incompatible existing European treaties has confounded the creation of 
a unitary patent system. 
Proposals for a unitary patent system can be informed by present-
day implementations of unitary intellectual property rights, including 
the U.S. federal court and Community design court regimes. The 
specialized Community design approach is preferred over that of the 
United States because it enables higher rates of precedential formation, 
leading to greater legal certainty. This, in turn, faciliates transactions 
associated with patent protection, encourages participation in the unitary 
patent system and ultimately lowers costs. The latest drafts of the 
unitary patent Regulation and Patent Court agreement and statute would 
substantially achieve the benefits of the Community design approach, 
while judiciously limiting participation in the agreement and 
strengthening the Patent Court’s obligations to comply with EU law. 
Finally, calls to implement the unitary patent entirely within EU 
institutions and for exclusion of the ECJ from its enforcement are 
unfounded. The Lisbon Treaty provides an implied legal basis for the 
involvement of non-EU institutions such as the EPO, whose 
involvement would be necessary as a practical matter in administering a 
high quality unitary patent. Any Patent Court that excludes an ECJ role 
is unlikely to pass muster under EU law. Moreover, the U.S. court 
model suggests that a specialized patent court that is checked by a 
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generalist court can indeed flourish if given sufficient time and latitude 
to establish its jurisprudence. For the foregoing reasons, the latest draft 
of the Patent Court agreement and unitary patent Regulation may well 
have finally converged on a practicable approach that will propel the 
long awaited breakthrough Europe has sought for the better part of the 
last forty years. 
 
